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Abstract
The safety design is very important to civil aircraft. In order to verify the civil aircraft design whether meet the 
requirement of airworthiness regulation about the hazards to an airplane in the event of uncontained turbine engine 
rotor failure, which require the design measures to minimize the hazards in the case of uncontained turbine engine 
rotor failure. Airworthiness compliance verification method is presented in this paper .Firstly, in the cause of 
uncontained rotor fragments bursting out, the hazards validation method is proposed based on the results of airplane 
level functional hazard analysis (FHA) and fault tree analysis (FTA) in this paper. Secondly, airworthiness 
compliance verification procedure is developed. Thirdly, quantitative assessment model of hazards caused is 
proposed and calculated. Finally, an example show the whole airworthiness compliance verification procedure 
include hazards validation, quantitative calculation and airworthiness compliance verdict  Results show that the 
hazard combinations resulting in multiple systems failure can be identified, thus providing more sufficient basis for 
airplane design improvement to minimize the hazards caused by uncontained engine rotor failure.
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1. Introduction
Uncontained turbine engine rotor failure (UERF) is one of typical particular risks threatening 
aircraft[1]. The uncontained fragments busting out from engine with high velocity can penetrate fuselage, 
fuel tanks, system components and other engines of the airplane, and it is highly possible that uncontained 
rotor failure cause catastrophic accident. Research has shown that it is unlikely to eliminate uncontained 
rotor failure completely, hence airplane design specifications require that design precautions are taken to 
minimize the hazard from such events[2-5]. 
The Advisory Circular 20-128A “Design Considerations for Minimizing Hazards Caused by 
Uncontained Turbine Engine and Auxiliary Power Unit Rotor Failure” of Federal Aviation 
Administration provides accepted design precautions, safety analysis method and applicable probability 
level of catastrophic hazards[6]. The safety analysis method identifies catastrophic hazards within the 
impacted area of airplane by establishing “Functional Hazard Tree” or “System Matrix”, however, the 
method could omits some potential hazard combinations of components  likely when analyzing 
catastrophic functional hazard involving multiple systems in the case of  multiple fragments bursting out. 
In order to identify potential catastrophic hazards to an airplane more completely in the event of UERF, a 
method based on the results of airplane level functional hazard analysis (FHA) and using fault tree 
analysis (FTA) is proposed in this paper.
This paper provides an improved method for calculating the occurrence probability of catastrophic 
hazard caused by uncontained engine rotor failure. To the uncontained failure model of single fragment 
and multiple fragments, the catastrophic hazard probability calculation model for single rotor stage and 
mean probability calculation model for airplane are provided separately.
2. Definition and assumptions 
2.1. Uncontained turbine engine failure model
Uncontained turbine engine failure model is a model describing the characteristics of uncontained 
fragments, including the size, mass, spread angle, energy and number shown in table 1. The fragment 
spread angle of specific type determines the impact area of the fragment.
Table 1 Uncontained turbine engine failure model [6,7]
Type Maximum dimension Mass Spread angle
1/3 disc fragment 1/3*b+ R 1/3 bladed disc mass ±3º
Intermediate fragment 1/3*(b+ R) 1/30 bladed disc mass ±5º
Alternative fragment 1/3*b+ R 1/3 disc mass ±5º
Small fragments 1/2*b (tip part) 1/2 blade mass ±15º
Fan blade fragment 1/3*c (tip part) 1/3 fan blade ±15º
Note: 1) b=blade length, R=disc radius, c＝fan blade length (less blade root & platform).
2) Alternative fragment is an alternative to the model of 1/3 disc fragment and intermediate fragment.
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2.2. Assumptions
The UERF hazard identification and quantitative calculation base on the assumptions as following: 1) 
The fragment is considered to possess infinite energy, to be capable of severing lines, wiring, cables and 
unprotected structure in its path [6]; 2) Uncontained fragments will not burst out independently from 
more than one rotor stage or engine at the same time; 3) Fragment travels along a trajectory path that is 
tangential to the fragment centroid locus in the direction of rotor rotation, and to be undeflected from its 
original trajectory unless deflection shields are fitted (protective shielding or an engine being impacted 
may be assumed to have sufficient mass to stop even the most energetic fragment)[6]; 4) Fragment rotates 
about its centroid without tumbling and sweeps a path equal to twice the greatest radius that can be struck 
from the fragment centroid that intersects its periphery[6]; 5)The probability of rotor failure is assumed to 
be 1.0 for each of all rotor stages. For the analysis the individual risk(s) from each rotor stage of the 
engine should be assessed and tabled.6) The probability of release of debris within the maximum spread 
angle is uniformly distributed over all directions[6]; 7) Independent failures of critical components will 
not occur during uncontained rotor failure period.
3. UERF Hazard identification method
3.1. Basic idea of the method
Since there are a large number of components located in UERF impact area, if a manner from 
component level to airplane function level is taken, the hazard identification need analyze the effect 
combinations of multiple fragment swept paths, thus resulting in a large work and missing some potential 
catastrophic hazards likely. Based on the analysis above, a manner from airplane function level to 
component level is considered. First determine the catastrophic functional hazards caused by UERF 
within all rotor stage impact area. Then establish UERF fault tree and obtain the minimal cut sets 
resulting in catastrophic failure conditions on the airplane. Finally, analyze each minimal cut for every 
rotor stage. A minimal cut set will be considered as a UERF hazard if the minimal cut set can be triggered 
by uncontained fragment or multiple fragments from the same rotor stage.
3.2. Functional hazard identification
Based on the results of aircraft level functional hazard analysis (FHA), the functional hazard 
identification is performed with every second level function of aircraft function list as a unit. A second 
level function will be excluded if the function has no failure condition with a catastrophic effect, or at last 
one of the necessary components performing the function is located without the impact areas of all rotor 
stages. Then the second level functions remained in aircraft function list are the objectives that need to 
analysis in detail. Furthermore, the functional hazard identification should refer to airplane fault tree, and 
supplement structural functional hazard and other functional hazard omitted likely. 
3.3. UERF FAULT TREE
The top event of UERF fault tree is catastrophic failure conditions of airplane. The direct causes 
resulting in top event are losses of critical functions of airplane, and the fundamental causes are 
combination of component failures. Connect the top event and functional hazard events determined by the 
functional hazard identification with boolean logic gates, and the upper tiers of UERF fault tree are 
developed. Then analyze the causes of each functional hazard down through successively more detailed 
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levels of the system design until the root causes are component failures, and the primary UERF fault tree 
are established, shown in figure 1. Thought simplifying the fault tree and determining minimal cut sets, 
the causes and failure paths of the top event within impact area of all rotor stages are obtained.
3.4. Triggering analysis
Fig. 1 Hierarchical chart of the UERF fault tree
According to the assumption 2.2, not all minimal cut sets can be triggered by the fragment or 
fragments from each rotor stage due to the scatter of the basic events constituting a minimal cut set within 
different impact areas of rotor stages. To the uncontained failure model of single one-third disc fragment, 
intermediate fragment and three one-third fragments required to have a quantitative assessment in AC20-
128A, an analysis form is established for each engines as shown in table 2. Give a mark as √ under the 
uncontained model and rotor stage to a minimal cut set if the basic events constituting the minimal cut set 
can be triggered by the uncontained failure model (or triggering model) under the rotor stage, else give a 
mark as ×. As part of the UERF safety analysis, qualitative assessment will be performed to the minimal 
cut sets with mark as √.
Table 2 Hazard identification table for UERF
Minimal 
cut set
LPC1 LPC2 … LPTX
M D 3D M D 3D M D 3D
Set 1
Set 2
……
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Note: LPC=low-pressure compressor, LPT=low-pressure turbine, M=intermediate fragment, D=single one-third disc fragment, 
3D=three one-third disc fragments of single rotor stage.
3.5. UERF hazard identification process
A UERF hazard identification process includes the following steps: 
1) Determine UERF impact area. Include every impact areas of all rotor stage and fan.
2) Determine systems and components that can be affected.
3) Functional hazard identification. Identify the critical functional hazards based on the results of 
airplane level functional hazard analysis (FHA). 
4) UERF fault tree analysis. Include establishing UERF fault tree and determining minimal cut sets.
5) Triggering analysis. A minimal cut set will be a UERF hazard if the minimal cut set can be triggered 
by (multiple) uncontained rotor debris from the same rotor stage.
6) Form UERF hazard list. Include constitution, fight phase, triggering model and rotor stage to a 
hazard.
4. Quantitative assessment model of hazard caused by UERF
The quantitative assessment of hazards base on the 2.2 assumptions.
4.1. Catastrophic hazard probability calculation model for single rotor stage
1) The cause of single fragment
Assume that an airplane powered by E engines (APU analyzed separately), the number of rotor stages 
of each engine e is R , the number of catastrophic hazards within the impact area of rotor stage u is uH , 
the number of basic events constituting catastrophic hazard h is hN , and a basic event represent a 
critical component failure, then the probability calculation model of the catastrophic hazards caused by  
single fragment from the rotor stage u within the impact area of rotor stage u of engine e can be 
represented as follow.
                                                               (1)
Where iX is the spread angle variable for component i , ],[ EIi SSX ∈ , iX 1 is the entry angle of 
spread risk angle of component i , iX 2 is the exit angle of spread risk angle of component i , shown in 
figure 2; iY is the translational angle variable for component i , ]360,0[∈iY , iY1 is the entry angle of 
translational risk angle of component i , iY2 is the exit angle of translational risk angle of component i ,
shown in figure 3; j is the flight phase, jR is the percentage of uncontained engine failures 
occurring within each flight phase j , shown in table 3; ijF is the other risk factor of component i in 
flight phase j ; k is the type of fragment, kS is the spread angle of k -type fragment; ijC is the
flight phase coefficient of component i .
If k =1 represents small fragment, k =2 represents intermediate fragment and k =3 represents
single one-third disc fragment, then 1S = 30º, 2S = 10ºand 3S = 6º[6]. If the failure of component i is 
one of basic events constituting catastrophic hazard h in flight phase j , then ijC =1, else ijC =0.
2)The cause of multiple fragments
The probability calculation model of the catastrophic hazards caused by multiple fragments of the
rotor stage u within the impact area of rotor stage u of engine e can be represented as follow.
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(2)
Where K is the number of types of fragments in an uncontained event; M is the total number of 
fragments in an uncontained event; kM is the number of k -type fragments in an uncontained event; 
t is one of the necessary sweeping paths in which catastrophic hazard h is triggered; tN is the 
number of basic events located in sweeping path t ， and the basic events constitute part of 
catastrophic hazard h ; T is the number of the necessary sweeping paths in which catastrophic
hazard h is triggered, hN ≥T≥1.
Fig.2 Spread angle variable (Vertical View)                                 Fig.3 Translational angle variable (Front View)
Table 3 The percentage of uncontained engine failures occurring within each flight phase [6]
Flight Phase Code Rj
Take-off before V1 T1 35%
V1 to first power reduction T2 20%
Climb F1 22%
Cruise F2 14%
Descent F3 3%
Approach F4 2%
Landing/Reverse L 4%
4.2. Catastrophic hazard mean probability calculation model for airplane
1) The cause of single fragment
To the uncontained failure model of single fragment, based on the assessments for each rotor stage 
of each engine, the catastrophic hazards mean probability for airplane is 
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2) The cause of multiple fragments
To the uncontained failure model of multiple fragments, the catastrophic hazards mean probability
for airplane is
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5. UERF airworthiness compliance verification rules
In order to show that the new design aircraft is compliance with airworthiness regulation, the two 
rules[6] followed must be proved by different methods, such as design drawings, calculation, simulation, 
analysis, etc.
1) Practical design precautions have been taken to minimize the damage that can be caused by
uncontained engine debris. The design precautions must be included the followed but not limited to:
a) The key components, system and structure will be out of the UERF impact area;
b) The key components, system and structure will be redundancy, separate (the separate distance is at 
least  equal to the max diameter of 1/3 rotor disc )and isolated design measures if the components , 
structure and system was inevitable in the UERF impact area;
c) The key components, system and structure will be sheltered from each kind of UERF debris; 
d) The key structure will be taken multi-direction force transfer structure and crack arrest design 
measures and damage tolerance analysis.
2) Acceptable risk levels, see table 4, as specified in AC 20-128A, Paragraph 10, have been achieved 
for each critical Failure Model.
Table 4 Summary of Acceptable Risk Level Criteria
Requirement Criteria
Average 1/3 Disc Fragment 1 in 20
Average Intermediate Fragment 1 in 40
Average Alternate Model 1 in 20 @ ± 5°Spread Angle
Multiple Disc Fragments 1 in 10
Any single fragment (except for structural damage) 2 x corresponding average criterion
6. EXAMPLE
An analysis is performed on a small generic business jet. 
6.1. Practical design precautions verification
Practical design precautions have been taken to minimize the damage that can be caused by 
uncontained engine debris. and the design measures must be proved by different methods, such as design 
drawings, calculation, simulation, analysis, etc.
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6.2. UERF HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 
1) Determine UERF impact area. The jet is powered by a turbofan engine mounted on root of vertical 
stabilizer behind the aft pressure bulkhead. The UERF impact area of the jet is shown in figure 4.
2) Determine systems and components can be impact. The impacted systems and structures include 
flight control system, fuel system, fire protection system, powerplant, horizontal stabilizer, vertical 
stabilizer and tail cone. The elevator and rudder are controlled respectively by two separate cable systems.
3) Functional hazard identification. The catastrophic functional hazards of the jet are shown in table 5. 
4) UERF fault tree analysis. Establish UERF fault tree of the jet is shown in figure 5, and the definition
of the failure events are shown in table 6 and table 7. Obtain nineteen minimal cut sets include {B1, B3}, 
{B1, B4}, {B2, B3}, {B2, B3}, etc.
                         Fig. 4 UERF impact area Fig.                                                      5 Example of the UERF fault tree
Table 5 Catastrophic airplane functional hazard 
Code 1st level Code 2nd level
E1 Loss of thrust
E5 Loss of fuel supply
E6 Engine stop and loss of restart
E2 Loss of flight controls
E7 Loss of elevator controls
E8 Loss of rudder controls
E3 Fires out of control
E9 Engine fires out of control
E10 Tail cone fires out of control
E4 Loss of structure E11 Tail cone load exceed structure limits
5) Triggering analysis. Perform triggering analysis to each minimal cut set, shown in table 7.
6) Analysis result. In the impact areas of all rotor stages, eleven catastrophic hazards are identified. 
There is no catastrophic hazard to single intermediate fragment model and small fragments model, one 
catastrophic hazard to single one-third disc fragment model, and there are eleven catastrophic hazards to 
three one-third disc fragments. Analysis shows that the UERF catastrophic hazards of the jet have been 
identified effectively. These hazards should be quantified, if the final hazard probability is not beyond 
acceptable level, then the design of the jet meet the UERF safety requirements, else appropriate 
preventive measures should be taken.
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Table 6 FTA code and event definition
Code Event definition Code Event definition
T Catastrophic failure conditions of airplane E21 Loss of rudder control systems
A1 Oil pipe 1# failure A2 Oil pipe 2# failure
E31 Loss of main rudder control system E32 Loss of backup rudder control system
B1 Rudder control cable 1# failure B2 Rudder tail cone pulley 1# failure
B3 Rudder control cable 2# failure B4 B4-Rudder tail cone pulley 2# failure
D1 Starboard side keel web failure D1 Port side keel web failure
Table 7 Example of the UERF hazard identification
Minimal cut set LPC1 LPC2 … LPT4
M D 3D M D 3D M D 3D
{A1, A2} × × × × × × × × ×
{B1, B3} × × √ × × √ × × √
{B1, B4} × × × × × × × × ×
{B2, B3} × × × × × × × × ×
{B2, B4} × × √ × × × × × ×
{D1, D2} × × √ × × √ × × √
… …
6.3. QUANTITATIVE CALCULATION
The jet is powered by a turbofan engine mounted on root of vertical stabilizer behind the aft pressure 
bulkhead. The engine consists of fourteen rotor stages: the fan and three-stage low-pressure compressor 
(LPC1-3), five-stage high-pressure compressor (HPC1-5), high-pressure turbine (HPT1) and four-stage 
low-pressure turbine (TPL1-4). 
1) Input information. The quantitative assessment of hazards is based on the results of hazard 
identification. Method of UERF hazard identification reference AC20-128A or related papers. Through 
the UERF hazard identification to the jet, eleven catastrophic hazards are identified in the impact areas of 
all rotor stages. See table 8. There is no catastrophic hazard to single intermediate fragment model and 
small fragments model, one catastrophic hazard to single one-third disc fragment model, and there are 
eleven catastrophic hazards to three one-third disc fragments.
Table 8 Catastrophic hazards list
Hazard Flight Phase Basic Event Definition Model Rotor stage
{A1,A2} T1,T2,F1,F3 A1-Oil pipe 1# failure, A2-Oil pipe 2# failure D, 3D HPC5
{B1,B3} ALL B1-Rudder control cable 1# failure, B3-Rudder control cable 2# failure 3D All rotor stage
{B2,B4} ALL B2-Rudder tail cone pulley 1# failure, B4-Rudder tail cone pulley 2# failure 3D LPC1
{D1, D2} ALL D1-Starboard side keel web failure, D2-Port side keel web failure 3D All rotor stage
……
Note: D is single one-third disc fragment, and 3D is three one-third disc fragments. 
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Table 9 Catastrophic hazard probability for each rotor stage
Debris
Hazard
LPC1 LPC2 … HPC5 … LPT4
M D 3D M D 3D M D 3D M D 3D
{A1,A2} 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0271 0.0523 0 0 0
{B1,B3} 0 0 0.0030 0 0 0.0029 0 0 0.0027 0 0 0.0029
{B2,B4} 0 0 0.0013 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
{D1, D2} 0 0 0.0041 0 0 0.0040 0 0 0.0038 0 0 0.0040
……
Note: M is single intermediate fragment.
2) Catastrophic hazard probability calculation for Single Rotor Stage. To each uncontained failure 
model required in AC20-128A, calculate the probability of catastrophic hazards within the impact area of 
each rotor stage, and the result as shown in table 9.
3) Catastrophic hazard mean probability calculation for airplane. Calculate the mean probability of 
catastrophic hazards for all rotor stages to each uncontained failure model, and the catastrophic hazard 
probability for aircraft can be obtained, as shown in table 10. Comparing with the applicable criteria 
provided in AC20-128A, the result of quantitative assessment is within an acceptable range, thus showing 
that the design of the jet meet the requirements to minimize the hazards to an airplane in the event of 
uncontained engine rotor failure.
Table 10 Catastrophic hazard probability for aircraft
Uncontained Failure Model Result Criteria[6]
Intermediate Fragment 0 0.0250
One-Third Disk Fragment 0.0019 0.0500
3* One-Third Disk Fragment 0.0110 0.1000
7. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, a method based on the results of airplane level functional hazard analysis (FHA) and 
using fault tree analysis (FTA) is proposed to identify UERF hazards, especially in the cause of multiple
uncontained rotor fragments bursting out. Meanwhile， an advanced method for calculating occurrence 
probability of catastrophic hazards caused by uncontained aero-engine rotor failure based on AC20-128A 
is presented. The improved method considers the cases fully that multiple uncontained rotor fragments 
burst out, and that several critical components are located in same path of single fragment, thus providing 
more accurate assessment for uncontained engine rotor failure. Finally, an example shows that the 
method is validity, thus providing more sufficient basis for UERF safety design improvement.
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